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1  Items in the record are referred to by their district court docket number (“D.
xx”).  Transcript cites (“Tr.”) are referred to by their date.  Items that are included in
Appellant’s Appendix also have an “Appx.” cite.
1
JURISDICTION
The Federal Trade Commission (“Commission” or “FTC”), an agency of the
United States government, initiated this action in the United States District Court for
the District of Wyoming seeking relief for violations of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41,
et seq., committed by defendants Accusearch, Inc. d/b/a Abika.com, and Accusearch’s
owner, Jay Patel (henceforth, the defendants are referred to as “Accusearch”).  The
district court’s jurisdiction over this matter derives from 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a),
and 1345; and from 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
In its Notice of Appeal, Accusearch seeks review of four orders issued by the
district court: 1) the Order and Judgment, which was entered on December 20, 2007
(D.132, Appx. 1605)1; 2) the Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, which
was entered on September 28, 2007 (D.120, Appx. 1383); 3) the Order on Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses, which was entered on March 28, 2007
(D.118); and 4) the Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, which was entered on July 13,
2006 (D.21, Appx. 101).  The Order and Judgment is final and is appealable pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Appeal of that order supports appeal of the other three
interlocutory orders.  Norton v. The City of Marietta, Oklahoma, 432 F.3d 1145, 1156
n.8 (10th Cir. 2005).  
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2Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, which was filed on January 9, 2008, was timely,
under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
1) Whether Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1), immunizes Accusearch’s conduct (i.e., obtaining and selling confidential
phone records without consumers’ knowledge or consent) from any challenge by the
Commission.
2) Whether the Commission lacks authority to bring its law enforcement action
against Accusearch, where Accusearch’s unfair practices involve the sale of
confidential information originally collected by telephone companies subject to the
FCC’s jurisdiction.
3) Whether the district court abused its discretion or violated the Constitution
when, having found that Accusearch engaged in unfair practices, it entered injunctive
relief against Accusearch.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case, the Course of Proceedings, and the Disposition
Below
The Commission’s complaint alleged that Accusearch engaged in unfair
practices by obtaining and selling confidential consumer telephone records without
consumers’ knowledge or authorization.  Accusearch procured these records from
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2  Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), prohibits, inter alia, “unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”  Section 13(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 53(b), provides that “in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper
proof, the [district] court may issue, a permanent injunction.”
3
various vendors who could only obtain them by deception or other illegal means.  The
district court granted the Commission’s motion for summary judgment.  The court
held that Accusearch’s practices were unfair, thereby violating the FTC Act, because
they caused substantial injury to consumers, the injury was not reasonably avoidable,
and the injury was not offset by any benefits.  The court rejected Accusearch’s
contention that, pursuant to the Communications Decency Act, it was exempt from
prosecution.  The court then imposed injunctive relief, prohibiting Accusearch from
selling certain types of personal information, including telephone records, unless it
could obtain that information legally.  Accusearch has appealed the district court’s
judgment. 
B. Facts and Proceedings Below
1. Background
The Commission commenced the underlying action in May 2006 by filing a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.  D.1.  The
complaint was brought pursuant to Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
It alleged that Accusearch, Inc., and its sole owner and officer, Jay Patel, had violated
Section 5(a) of the FTC Act 2 by obtaining and selling consumers’ confidential
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4telephone records to third parties without the consumers’ knowledge or authorization.
The complaint alleged that Accusearch’s practices not only violated consumers’
privacy, but also jeopardized their health and safety.
Accusearch sells personal information over the internet.  D.75, Ex. 21 at  ¶ 5.
Since at least 2004, and until 2006, Accusearch sold, inter alia, confidential consumer
telephone records without consumers’ permission.  In particular, it touted its business
by claiming that it could obtain “Details of incoming or outgoing calls from any phone
number, prepaid calling card or Internet Phone.  Phone searches are guaranteed and
available for every country in the world.”  D.120 at 3 (Appx. 1385).  Accusearch
advertised that the information it was selling would typically “include the date, time
and duration of calls.”  Id.  Accusearch’s website claimed that its service would be
valuable for anyone wanting to check on the background of “Dates, Lovers, [or]
Spouses,” and for locating “Co-workers * * * [or] ex-spouses.”  D.78 at Ex. 12 (Appx.
1315, 1318).  Call detail records such as those sold by Accusearch can reveal intimate
details about a person’s lifestyle, business affiliations, or social relationships.  D.58
at Ex. 6, p. 4-6, 21-25.  They may be used to threaten an individual’s reputation,
employment status, or physical safety.  See id.
However, federal law prohibits telephone companies from disclosing the very
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3  Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 222, and its implementing regulations, 47 C.F.R. §§
64.2001-64.2011, telephone companies are prohibited (with certain exceptions not
relevant here) from disclosing details of their customers’ telephone calls (i.e., date,
number called, time, and duration) unless they first obtain their customers’ consent.
Accusearch sold this sort of information, and there was no consent prior to the
disclosure of the information.  See, e.g., D.75, Exs. 22-29, 31-33.
4  Although this case concerns telephone records, Accusearch sold, and, in some
instances, has continued to sell, a wide variety of other information, including social
security number verification, department of motor vehicle records, GPS traces
(pinpointing the exact location of a cell phone at a given time), and reverse e-mail
look-ups.  D.120 at 2.
5
sort of telephone records that Accusearch was selling.3  As a result, the information
it sold could be obtained only by theft, by deception (i.e., by impersonating the
consumer who was the target of the search), by hacking the telephone company’s
computer system, or by bribing a telephone company employee to steal the records.
D.75, Ex. 41.
Those wishing to purchase telephone records from Accusearch would place
orders on Accusearch’s website, www.abika.com.  D.58, Ex. 2 at ¶ 4 (Appx. 610-
611).4  Accusearch customers would designate the information they wanted, and the
cost of the service depended upon the nature of the information requested.  Id.
Accusearch’s price for telephone records ranged from $80 to $225.  D.58, Ex. 3 at 18.
After receiving an order for telephone records from a customer, Accusearch would
contact one of its vendors.  D.58, Ex. 2 at ¶¶  3, 5 (Appx. 610, 611).  Accusearch’s
vendors, which consisted of various companies or individuals, would obtain the
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Accusearch would then supply the information to its customers.  Id.  Accusearch’s
customers communicated only with Accusearch; they did not know who was actually
conducting the search.  Id.  If, after the start of a search, a vendor needed additional
information to complete the search, the vendor would request that information from
Accusearch, and Accusearch would forward the request to its customer.  Id. at ¶ 7
(Appx. 612-613).  Accusearch’s customers made payment to Accusearch, and
Accusearch made payments to the vendors.  Id. at ¶ 11 (Appx. 614).  Accusearch’s
customers had no contact with Accusearch’s vendors.  Indeed, Accusearch did not
want its customers to learn the identity of any vendor -- it kept its vendors’ names
secret to prevent its customers, on future orders, from bypassing Accusearch and
obtaining the information directly from the vendors.  Id. at ¶ 5 (Appx. 611).  Similarly,
Accusearch did not provide the vendors with information regarding the identity of
Accusearch’s customers.  Id. at ¶ 6 (Appx. 611-612).
Accusearch also used its website to amass its stable of vendors.  D.58, Ex. 3 at
10-11.  Although Accusearch advised its vendors that it would only accept the results
of searches that had been conducted in compliance with the law, id. at 11, in fact, it
winked at its vendors’ practices.  In particular, if a vendor merely stated that it was
complying with the law, Accusearch would accept search results regardless of whether
the vendor refused to reveal its sources, D.75, Ex. 40 at 226, or refused to reveal its
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secrets”).  Accusearch accepted information from one vendor that, when questioned
regarding the legality of its techniques, merely stated that it obtained the information
it was supplying to Accusearch from other companies.  Id. at 246.
Despite its vendors’ assurances, Accusearch had ample evidence that its
vendors’ searches were not conducted according to law.  Accusearch knew that its
vendors attempted to break into password-protected accounts.  D.75, Ex. 19 at Att. A,
p.10.  It knew that its vendors used “inside sources” to evade privacy protections.  Id.
at p.6.  It knew that its vendors continued to access accounts even as the individuals
being spied on attempted to shield their accounts.  Id. at 28.
Accusearch’s invasions of privacy caused substantial harm.  Stalkers and other
abusers can use telephone records to locate their victims, identify their victims’ friends
and associates, and monitor their behavior.  D.58, Ex. 5 at 16-21.  Moreover, even
consumers who did not experience physical danger or economic injury experienced
real and substantial emotional harm.  For example, one female who was targeted by
Accusearch was “startled” to discover (as a result of the Commission’s investigation),
that Accusearch had sold several months’ worth of her confidential telephone records
to a male former co-worker.  
My husband and I are deeply disturbed and upset to know that this
person has spent a good deal of money and effort to obtain our cellular
telephone records.  We are frightened and anxious, particularly because
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been obsessively interested in us and our records.
D.75, Ex. 25 at ¶ 14.  Another target, again a female, was distraught to discover that
Accusearch had sold her telephone records to an abusive ex-boyfriend who was
stalking her, and who had used those records to locate her.  D.75, Ex. 27.  A third
Accusearch target, a male, was victimized by his ex-wife.  She used Accusearch to
obtain unlisted cell phone numbers, and then she placed harassing telephone calls to
the man and his sons.  As a result, the man obtained a domestic violence protective
order against his ex-wife.  D.75, Ex. 29.  Accusearch’s practices also imposed
monetary costs on consumers.  One consumer spent $400 to cancel a cell phone
account to which Accusearch had obtained access.  D.75, Ex. 25.
2. Proceedings below
The Commission’s complaint against Accusearch and Patel contained one count
(Appx. 18).  It alleged that, by obtaining and selling confidential telephone records
without the knowledge or consent of the consumers, defendants had engaged in an
unfair practice in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.  On June 6,
2006, Accusearch filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
arguing, inter alia, that the Commission was, without authority, attempting to enforce
47 U.S.C. § 222, the provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that restricts
telecommunication carriers from freely distributing the details of their customers’
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motion, holding that the Commission’s complaint stated a claim for relief for
violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.  Tr. 7/13/2006, at 23 (Appx.
96).
Both Accusearch and the Commission filed motions for summary judgment.
In its two motions, Accusearch argued that its conduct was immune, pursuant to
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”); that, as a matter of law,
the Commission could not establish that Accusearch violated the FTC Act; that the
Commission was not entitled to injunctive relief; that the Commission was equitably
estopped from challenging Accusearch’s conduct; and that the Commission lacked
jurisdiction to pursue Accusearch.  D.45, D.77 (Appx. 106, 1216).  In the
Commission’s motion, it argued that there were no issues of material fact, and that it
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  D.74 (Appx. 903).
On September 28, 2007, the district court granted the Commission’s motion,
and denied Accusearch’s motions.  D.120 (Appx. 1383).  The court observed that, for
Accusearch to prevail on its claim for immunity under the CDA, it would have to
show 1) that it was a provider or user of an interactive computer service; 2) that the
Commission’s claims treated it as the publisher or speaker of the information; and 3)
that it did not create or develop, in whole or in part, the information content at issue.
With respect to the first part of the test, the court held that, because Accusearch
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operated a website, it was a provider or user of an interactive computer service.  D.120
at 8 (Appx. 1390).  However, the court held that Accusearch could not satisfy the
second part of the test: Accusearch was not a “publisher” because it was not merely
delivering e-mail containing ill-gotten telephone records.  It was critical to the court
that it was Accusearch that was soliciting customer orders, that it was Accusearch that
was purchasing records from its vendors for a fee, and that it was Accusearch that was
reselling those records to its customers.  D.120 at 11 (Appx. 1393).  Finally, the court
held that Accusearch failed the third part of the test as well because, by soliciting the
misappropriation of telephone records and purchasing them for resale, it participated
in the creation or development of the information.  D.120 at 13 (Appx. 1395).
Next, the court held that Accusearch’s practices were unfair, and that, as a
result, they violated the FTC Act.  In particular, the court concluded that Accusearch’s
conduct met all the elements of unfairness.  First, Accusearch caused substantial
injury to consumers by providing confidential telephone records to third parties,
including stalkers and abusers, without consumers’ knowledge or consent.
Accusearch also caused economic injury to consumers who, as a result of the breach
of the privacy of their telephone records, changed telephone carriers or installed
security protections.  In addition, the court found that Accusearch’s practices caused
“substantial and real” emotional injury to consumers whose privacy was invaded.
Second, consumers could not reasonably avoid the injury because Accusearch
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obtained telephone records without consumers’ knowledge or consent.  And third,
there were no countervailing benefits that resulted from Accusearch’s practice of
illicitly obtaining and selling confidential telephone records.  D.120 at 13-19 (Appx.
1395-1401).
The court rejected Accusearch’s defense of equitable estoppel because its
contention that others were engaging in the same sort of conduct was not a sufficient
basis for this defense.  D.120 at 21 (Appx. 1403).  It also noted that, in denying
Accusearch’s motion to dismiss, it had already rejected Accusearch’s lack-of-
jurisdiction defense.  D.120 at 22 (Appx. 1404).  Finally, the court held that injunctive
relief would be appropriate even though Accusearch was no longer selling telephone
records.  In particular, the court noted that Accusearch was still selling other forms of
personal information (including social security number verification, DMV records,
medical records), and that with respect to the sale of that information, it could engage
in conduct similar to the illegal conduct it had previously engaged in.  D.120 at 20
(Appx. 1402).
On December 20, 2007, the court entered its Order and Judgment for Permanent
Injunction and Equitable Relief.  D.132 (Appx. 1605).  Paragraph I of the Order
banned Accusearch from selling telephone records or other consumer personal
information derived from telephone records unless it obtained that information in a
manner that was clearly permitted by law, regulation, or court order.  D.132 at 3
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(Appx. 1607).  Paragraph II of the Order prohibited Accusearch from: 1) purchasing
or selling any consumer personal information unless that information was lawfully
obtained from publicly available sources; 2) using false or deceptive representations
to obtain consumer personal information; and 3) requesting or purchasing consumer
personal information from any person unless it has a reasonable basis to believe that
the person obtaining the information will do so lawfully.  D.132 at 4 (Appx. 1608).
Paragraph III of the Order required Accusearch to assist the Commission in providing
a notice to consumers whose records Accusearch sold.  That notice will inform those
consumers, inter alia, of the date their records were sold, and the name of the person
to whom they were sold.  D.132 at 4 (Appx. 1608).  Paragraph IV of the Order
required Accusearch to disgorge $199,692.71 to the Commission as equitable
monetary relief.  D.132 at 6 (Appx. 1610). 
Accusearch filed its Notice of Appeal on January 9, 2008.  D.133 (Appx. 1619).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Accusearch argues that, pursuant to § 230(c)(1) of the CDA, its conduct is
exempt from the FTC Act.  It also argues that it is exempt because the
Telecommunications Act does not apply to its conduct.  Both of these are issues of
law, which this Court reviews de novo.  Trujillo v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. Ret.
Plan. Comm., 203 F.3d 733, 736 (10th Cir. 2000).  It reviews the district court’s grant
of injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion.  Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436
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F.3d 1228, 1242 (10th Cir. 2006).  That is, this Court should accept the district court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and may review the court’s
application of legal principles de novo.  Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Accusearch does not dispute that it engaged in the conduct challenged by the
Commission, or that its conduct caused substantial injury that consumers could not
avoid, or that it violated the FTC Act.  Instead, it claims that, pursuant to § 230(c)(1)
of the CDA, it is altogether exempt from the FTC Act.  But, as the district court
observed, applying that exemption to Accusearch is like fitting a square peg into a
round hole.  In particular, Congress enacted that exemption to promote the internet as
an interactive public forum.  Accusearch does nothing to further that goal because its
website is not interactive, i.e., it does not offer any sort of forum for the public.  (Part
I.A, infra.)
Accusearch also fails to satisfy any of the three statutory requirements for
§ 230(c)(1) immunity.  First, it cannot show that it is a “provider or user of an
interactive computer service.”  The district court mistakenly believed that any user of
the internet would satisfy this requirement.  But to fit within this requirement, an
entity must offer an interactive service, such as an internet bulletin board.  Section
230(c)(1) shields those who offer such interactive services from liability for
statements posted by members of the public.  Accusearch cannot be subjected to this
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sort of liability because its website is not interactive, and no member of the public can
post on it.  (Part I.B, infra.)
Accusearch cannot meet the second requirement for § 230(c)(1) immunity
because the Commission’s complaint does not “treat[] [it] as the publisher or speaker”
of any information.  In fact, the Commission has challenged Accusearch’s business
of procuring and selling confidential telephone records without consumers’
knowledge or consent.  Nothing in the complaint challenges publishing or speaking.
None of the cases cited by Accusearch advances its cause because in each of those
cases, the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant liable solely as a result of the
defendant’s dissemination of statements made by others, or dissemination of
information regarding actions taken by others.  Accusearch’s liability in this case
derives from its own conduct, not because of information disseminated on its website.
(Part I.C, infra.)
Accusearch cannot satisfy the third requirement for § 230(c)(1) immunity
because the Commission is not seeking to hold it liable for “information provided by
another information content provider.”  In fact, the Commission’s complaint seeks to
hold Accusearch liable for the creation or development of the confidential telephone
records that it sold.  It solicited orders for the records, and then it instructed its
vendors to obtain those records.  Thus, Accusearch’s liability is based on its own
conduct, not the conduct of another.  (Part I.D, infra.)
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Accusearch mistakenly suggests that, because the Telecommunications Act of
1996 prohibits telecommunications carriers from disclosing customer telephone
records, including the records that Accusearch was selling, Accusearch’s
dissemination of those records is somehow exempt from the FTC Act.  It is true that
the Telecommunications Act does not apply to Accusearch, but nothing in that Act
repeals the consumer protections of the FTC Act.  The dissemination of confidential
telephone records is regulated by more than one statute, and the FTC Act clearly
applies to Accusearch.  (Part II, infra.)
The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering injunctive relief
against Accusearch.  The evidence shows that its violations are likely to recur, and
there is ample opportunity for recurrence because Accusearch is still in the business
of selling confidential personal information.  And, although Accusearch had ceased
its illegal conduct prior to the filing of the Commission’s complaint, it did so when
its conduct was already under investigation.  Such eleventh-hour conversions do not
obviate injunctive relief.  (Part III.A, infra.)
Finally, there is no merit to any of the constitutional arguments that Accusearch
raises.  The injunctive relief implicates, at most, the First Amendment’s intermediate
level of scrutiny for restrictions on commercial speech, and it easily satisfies the three-
part test for such restrictions.  First, the government has a substantial interest --
protecting consumer privacy.  Second, the relief furthers that interest by keeping
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confidential telephone records out of the hands of stalkers, abusers, and others who
have no right to see them.  Third, the restrictions are narrowly tailored because they
prohibit the very sorts of privacy infringements that the Commission seeks to prevent.
Nor are Accusearch’s Fifth Amendment due process rights violated by the fact that
the injunctive relief applies not just to telephone records but to its sale of any illegally
obtained personal information.  Because Accusearch has been found guilty of
violating the FTC Act, it must expect some fencing-in, preventing it from employing
the same illegal practices in other aspects of its business.  Finally, although
Accusearch alleges unconstitutional selective prosecution, it cannot establish any
element of such a violation -- it cannot show bad intent, or that it is a member of a
constitutionally protected class, or that others outside that class were not prosecuted.
(Part III.B, infra.)
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT § 230(c)(1) OF
THE CDA DOES NOT IMMUNIZE ACCUSEARCH’S ILLEGAL
CONDUCT
Accusearch does not dispute that, in connection with its sale of confidential
telephone records, it engaged in unfair practices in violation of the FTC Act.  That is,
it does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that its practices (i.e., sale of
confidential telephone records to third parties, such as stalkers and abusers, without
the consumers’ consent) caused substantial injury to consumers, that consumers could
Appellate Case: 08-8003     Document: 01011295790     Date Filed: 06/06/2008     Page: 25     
17
not reasonably avoid this injury, and that Accusearch’s practices produced no
offsetting benefits.  Instead, it argues that, pursuant to § 230(c)(1) of the CDA, its
practices are immune from prosecution.  However, as the district court correctly held,
the immunity provided by § 230(c)(1) simply does not apply to Accusearch’s conduct:
“in urging this application of the CDA, Defendants ask this Court to fit a square peg
into a round hole.”  D.120 at 6 (Appx. 1388).  That is, immunizing Accusearch’s
conduct would be contrary to congressional intent.  Moreover, to qualify for immunity
under § 230(c)(1), Accusearch must meet three requirements.  But it cannot meet any
one of those requirements, let alone all three.
A. The CDA balances the promotion of the internet with the protection of
consumer privacy
Section 230 of the CDA was enacted to further two goals.  First, it seeks “to
promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer
services and other interactive media.”  With respect to this goal, this Court noted that
Congress wanted to make sure that the internet could continue to “‘offer a forum for
a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development,
and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.’”  Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co., Inc. v.
America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000), quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(a)(3).  The section’s second goal is to remove “disincentives for the
development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower
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No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of --
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability
of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or
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parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material,” while at the same time “ensur[ing] vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment
by means of computer.”  47 U.S.C. §§  230(b)(1), (4), (5).
To promote these two goals, § 230(c) provides two exemptions from liability.
The first exemption, set forth in § 230(c)(1), furthers the first goal, i.e., promotion of
the internet:
No provider of user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.
§ 230(c)(1).  This exemption:
precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer
service provider in a publisher’s role.  Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a
service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional
editorial functions -- such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content -- are barred.
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
The second exemption, set forth in § 230(c)(2), furthers the second goal by
immunizing those internet service providers that filter offensive material.5  Congress
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enacted this second exemption to overturn Stratton-Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).  See H. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194
(1996), reprinted at 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 207-208.  In Stratton-Oakmont, the court
held that, because Prodigy had voluntarily deleted some messages on the basis of
offensiveness and bad taste, it therefore became legally responsible for messages that
it failed to delete.
This case concerns only the first exemption.  Although Accusearch claims that
§ 230(c)(1) exempts it from liability for its violations of the FTC Act, it is mistaken.
Plainly, Accusearch does not promote the goal the exemption seeks to further: its
website does not provide the public with any sort of forum, and its sale of confidential
telephone records does nothing to promote “diversity of political discourse,” or
“opportunities for cultural development,” or “intellectual activity.”  Because it would
be contrary to the purpose of § 230 to apply its immunity to Accusearch, there is little
wonder that Accusearch fails to satisfy any of the requirements for immunity under
§ 230(c)(1).
B. Accusearch cannot satisfy the first requirement for § 230(c)(1)
immunity because it is not a provider or user of an interactive computer
service
The district court held that Accusearch satisfied the first of the three immunity
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6  “Access software provider” is defined as:
a provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling
tools that do any one or more of the following:
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(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset,
organize, reorganize, or translate content.
§ 230(f)(4).
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requirements, simply because it operated a website.  See D.120 at 8 (Appx. at 1390).
But on this point, the district court was mistaken.  In particular, Accusearch cannot
satisfy this requirement because, during the relevant period, its website did not allow
for any interaction between third parties.  Thus, it did not offer an interactive
computer service.
To satisfy the first immunity requirement, an entity must be a “provider or user
of an interactive computer service.”  The CDA defines “interactive computer service”:
The term “interactive computer service” means any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems
operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).6
Those for whom this protection is relevant are those who operate internet
“bulletin boards,” i.e., forums on which members of the public may post information.
As Stratton-Oakmont shows, internet service providers frequently create such bulletin
boards.  In that case, Prodigy, the creator of the bulletin board, was an internet service
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provider.  In other situations, the bulletin boards may be created not by an internet
service provider, but by a user that is not itself an internet service provider.  The user
takes advantage of the internet to gain access to a wide audience.  Amazon.com is a
user that creates bulletin boards on which members of the public may post comments
regarding the books Amazon offers for sale.  See Universal Communication Systems,
Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 415 (1st Cir. 2007) (a “user” of Lycos’ service
created a bulletin board on which the public could post comments regarding a publicly
held company).  Regardless of whether the bulletin board is created by the provider
of the interactive computer service, or a user of that service, § 230(c)(1) seeks to
shield that creator from liability for statements posted by members of the public.
By no stretch of the imagination is Accusearch a provider of an interactive
computer service.  It operated as a store front through which its customers engaged
in private commercial transactions.  The only interaction was between Accusearch and
its customers, or between Accusearch and its vendors.  Thus, it simply did not provide
a “service, system, or access software” that “enables computer access by multiple
users.”  Indeed, there is no indication in the record that Accusearch “enable[s]
computer access” to anyone at all.  Nor is Accusearch a “user” in the limited sense of
§ 230(c)(1).  
Accusearch repeatedly claims that it “operates” an “interactive” search service.
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See Br. at 10, 13, 33, 34, 35.7  In fact, however, the uncontested declaration of
Accusearch’s former employee, Rhiannon Martinez, explains that, during the period
challenged by the Commission, Accusearch’s customers had no contact whatsoever
with Accusearch’s vendors.  Indeed, Accusearch took steps to make sure that its
customers never even learned the identity of the vendors who conducted the searches
that generated the information the customers purchased.  D.58, Ex. 2 at ¶ 5-6 (Appx.
611-612).  The only evidence that Accusearch cites consists of two declarations from
defendant Patel.  Both were dated well after the events that are the subject of the
Commission’s complaint, and both are cleverly written in the present tense.  See
Appx. 144, 1245.  At the time those declarations were written (December 2006,
January 2007), Accusearch had modified its business model and was no longer
operating as it had during the period challenged in the Commission’s complaint
(March 2003 until January 2006).  See D.58 at 4 (Appx. 395).  Thus, during the
relevant time period, there was nothing whatsoever that was “interactive” about
Accusearch’s website: it bore no resemblance to an internet bulletin board.
Accordingly, Accusearch was not a provider or user of an interactive computer service
and could not satisfy the first part of the test set forth in § 230(c)(1).
Both the district court and Accusearch mistakenly rely on Batzel v. Smith, 333
F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003), to support their conclusion that Accusearch was a provider
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or user of an interactive computer service merely because Accusearch operated a
website.  See D.120 at 8, Br. at 34-35.  However, facts of Batzel are very different
from this case.  In Batzel, defendant Smith made defamatory statements in an e-mail
suggesting that Batzel possessed artworks stolen by the Nazis.  He sent this e-mail to
defendant Cremers, who posted it on a museum security website that Cremers
controlled, and sent it to subscribers of a museum security internet newsletter that
Cremers assembled.  The Ninth Circuit panel held that, because Cremers used the
internet to post the website and distribute the newsletter, he was a “user” of an
interactive computer service, and thus satisfied the first part of the § 230(c)(1) test.
The facts of Batzel bear little resemblance to Accusearch’s illegal conduct.  The
plaintiff in Batzel sought to hold defendant Cremers liable for statements of a third
party (defendant Smith) merely because Cremers posted them on the internet.  Here,
the Commission seeks to hold Accusearch for its own conduct -- procuring and selling
confidential telephone records.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently stated that it had doubts
as to the correctness of the Batzel panel’s determination that the defendant was a user
of an interactive computer service.  Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170 n.28 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  The
problem with Batzel is that, with respect to the first immunity requirement (the entity
must be a “provider or user of an interactive computer service”), the panel’s
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2006).  D.120 at 8, Br. at 34.  That court held, without any elaboration, that it was
“irrefutable” that Amazon was an interactive computer service because “[i]ts primary
function is to allow multiple users to a computer service the ability to purchase
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(which the Eleventh Circuit, on review, stated was unnecessary to the resolution of the
case, 456 F.3d at 1324) is too broad because it would give any website operator a free
pass through the first part of the § 230(c)(1) immunity test.  Although some aspects
of Amazon’s website are, indeed, interactive, see infra, those aspects that were at issue
in Almeida were not.  There is nothing interactive if a website operator merely allows
members of the public to purchase items that the operator is selling.
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interpretation ignores the word “interactive.”  But no statute should be interpreted in
a manner that renders any term superfluous.  Andersen v. Director, Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs, 455 F.3d 1102, 1106 (10th Cir. 2006).  Moreover, the
panel’s broad interpretation in no way furthers Congress’s purpose, which was to
preserve the unique interactive aspect of the internet, see § 230(b)(2), because it was
far from clear that there was anything interactive about Cremers’s website or
newsletter.8
The other cases cited by the district court, and by Accusearch, also involve
situations that are very different from this case.  For example, in Schneider v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P. 3d 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001), Schneider sued Amazon
regarding defamatory comments that had been posted on that portion of Amazon’s
website that permits members of the public to make comments regarding books that
Amazon sells. The court, citing Zeran, noted that the purpose of § 230(c)(1) immunity
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because they involve entities that provided interactive use of the internet.  In Gentry
v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (2002), the plaintiffs sued eBay as a result of
counterfeit sports memorabilia that had been sold through eBay’s website.  The court
held that, because eBay was not the seller, but merely provided an internet forum on
which third parties could make sales, eBay was a provider or user of an interactive
computer service.  Id. at 831 n.7.  In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 207 F. Supp.
2d 1055 (C.D. 2002), aff’d, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), the plaintiff, a TV star,
brought an action for defamation and other torts against an internet dating service as
a result of a fake and defamatory dating profile that had been posted by an anonymous
member of the public.  The court held that, because members of the public are able to
“access and use,” i.e., add to, Metrosplash’s data base, Metrosplash is a provider or
user of an interactive computer service with respect the information posted by the
public.  Id. at 1065-66.  In Parker v. Google, 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006),
plaintiff alleged that a search of his name through Google’s search function would
lead to defamatory websites.  Pursuant to § 230(f)(4)(C), Google, which organizes,
caches, and permits the search of internet information, is clearly an access software
provider, and, pursuant to § 230(f)(2), is therefore a provider of an interactive
computer service.  Finally, in Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2005), the defendant was sued regarding defamatory comments that were posted
on an internet bulletin board that he operated.  Clearly, the defendant was a provider
or user of an interactive computer service.  Accusearch’s business bears no similarity
to any of these cases.
25
is to shield companies that “serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially
injurious messages.”  Id. at 41, citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31.  The court correctly
recognized that, with respect to this aspect of its operation, Amazon was a provider
or user of an interactive computer service, not just because it operated a website, but
because its website included the interactive forum on which anyone could post
comments.9
Accusearch is a “provider or user of an interactive computer service” only if
that phrase is interpreted so broadly that the word “interactive” becomes superfluous.
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Such an interpretation stretches the exemption provided by § 230(c)(1) far beyond the
purposes set forth by Congress.  Because Accusearch’s website only offered
customers the ability to purchase a product, not any opportunity for interaction, this
Court should hold that Accusearch cannot satisfy the first requirement for immunity
under § 230(c)(1).
C. The district court correctly held that Accusearch cannot satisfy
the second requirement for § 230(c)(1) immunity because the
Commission’s complaint does not treat it as a publisher or speaker
As the district court correctly recognized, the Commission’s complaint
challenges Accusearch’s practice of obtaining and selling confidential telephone
records, not its publication (or speaking) of any information.  D.120 at 9-12 (Appx.
1391-94).  The court noted that Accusearch might have been able to satisfy this
second requirement if it “merely delivered an email containing ill-gotten consumer
phone records.  Clearly, that is not the type of conduct at issue here.”  D.120 at 11
(Appx. 1393).  What the Commission has challenged is the practice of selling illegally
obtained telephone records, a practice that causes substantial consumer injury, and that
violates the FTC Act.  In particular, as explained by Rhiannon Martinez, Accusearch’s
former employee, D.58, Ex. 2 (Appx. 610), and as found by the district court, D.120
at 3 (Appx. 1385), Accusearch sold telephone records that it could obtain only through
improper means.  
That Accusearch was acting as a seller of information, not as a publisher of
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information sold by others, is clear from the manner in which it conducted its
business.  Each time it received an order for such records, it selected one of its
vendors and transmitted that order to the vendor.  When it transmitted the order, it
made sure that the vendor could not identify the customer who had placed the order.
After the vendor had obtained the records (through computer hacking, deception,
illegal insider contacts, etc.), the vendor provided that information to Accusearch.
Before Accusearch conveyed the information to its customer, it made sure that the
customer could not identify the vendor who had supplied the information to
Accusearch.  The customer paid Accusearch for the search results, based on prices set
forth on Accusearch’s website.  Accusearch paid its vendors for the information they
supplied based upon its agreements with the vendors.
The Commission alleged that Accusearch’s “practices in obtaining and selling
to third parties confidential customer phone records” without the consumer’s
knowledge or consent constituted an unfair practice that violated the FTC Act.  D.1
(Appx. 18).  Nothing in the complaint challenges publishing or speaking.  Indeed, as
the district court recognized, treating Accusearch as a publisher would be inconsistent
with the purpose of the immunity set forth in § 230(c)(1).  See D.120 at 11 (Appx.
1393). 
None of the cases cited by Accusearch, Br. at 27-28, advances its cause because
they involve entities whose business model was very different from Accusearch.  See
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10  Similarly, in Zeran, see Br. at 27, the court held that America Online was
entitled to immunity because the plaintiff sought to hold it liable for defamatory
statements made by another, and America Online’s only role was that it provided the
means through which that other party could publicize those statements.  129 F.3d at
330.  The defendants in Metrosplash, see Br. at 27, and in Schneider v. Amazon, see
Br. at 32, were entitled to immunity for the same reason.  339 F.3d at 1122; 31 P. 3d
at 38-39.
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D.120 at 11 (Appx. 1393) (district court recognized that Accusearch was not a
“publisher” because it was not merely delivering e-mails).  In each of those cases, the
defendant provided a means through which others were able to publicize information
through the internet, and the issue was whether the entity providing such means could
be held liable for the underlying communication.  For example, in Ben Ezra, see Br.
at 27, the plaintiff sued America Online for negligence and defamation, based on
allegedly inaccurate stock price information that third parties had posted on America
Online’s Quotes & Portfolio service area.  206 F.3d at 983.  Because America
Online’s only role was the transmission of the price information, the court held that
it was entitled to immunity.10  By contrast, Accusearch had a much broader role.
In another case cited by Accusearch, Stoner v. eBay, Inc., 2000 WL 1705637
(Cal. Super. 2000), see Br. at 29, a provider or user of an interactive computer service
(eBay) was sued solely for its role in conveying information regarding an illegal
product (sound recordings that violated copyright laws) to the public.  A third party
was the marketer of the recordings, and there was no allegation that eBay had any role
in their production.  As the court explained, “[a] principal objective of the
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11  See also Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (Br. at 31) (court held that craigslist, an
online meeting place, was not liable for ads that violated the Fair Housing Act and that
were placed on its site by third parties); Beyond Systems, Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422
F. Supp 2d 523 (D. Md. 2006) (Br. at 27) (court held that defendant Rackspace, Ltd.,
an internet service provider, was immune where the only source of its liability was the
transmission of illegal e-mails that originated with a third party); Barnes v. Yahoo!,
Inc., 2005 WL 3005602 (D. Or. 2005) (Br. at 28) (court held Yahoo was immune
where its liability was based solely on a false internet profile that plaintiff’s ex-
boyfriend had posted); Doe v. Bates, 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (Br. at 28)
(Yahoo was immune from liability for child pornography that appeared on an
interactive web-based forum hosted on its website); Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783
So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001) (Br. at 28) (America Online was not liable for child
pornography marketed by a third party through an America Online chat room); Doe
v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 2008 WL 2068064
(5th Cir. 2008) (Br. at 28) (MySpace, which allows members of the public to post
online profiles, was immune from the consequences of information on such a profile
that was created by a third party).
29
[§ 230(c)(1)] immunity provision is to encourage commerce over the Internet by
ensuring that interactive computer service providers are not held responsible for how
third parties use their services.”  Id. at *3.  That is, just as an interactive computer
service is not liable for information it merely publishes, the court in Stoner held that
eBay, which provides an interactive marketing service, is not liable for a product sold
by a third party where the service’s only role is conveying information regarding the
availability of that product to the public.11  Accusearch’s role was completely
different.
The Commission’s case against Accusearch challenges Accusearch’s procuring
and sale of confidential consumer telephone records without the knowledge of the
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consumer.  This is not a case in which liability is based on publication or speaking.
Accordingly, Accusearch cannot satisfy the second requirement for § 230(c)(1)
immunity.
D. The district court correctly held that Accusearch cannot satisfy
the third requirement for § 230(c)(1) immunity because the
information on which Accusearch’s liability was based was not
provided by another information content provider
As the district court correctly concluded, Accusearch could not satisfy the final
requirement for § 230(c)(1) immunity because the Commission challenged it for its
role as an information content provider.  In particular, the court found it significant
that it was as a result of Accusearch’s efforts that the telephone records were
misappropriated and transmitted to its customers.  D.120 at 13 (Appx. 1395).  
The CDA defines “information content provider”:
The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that
is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service.
§ 230(f)(3).  In fact, Accusearch was most definitely “responsible, in whole or in part,
for the creation or development” of the information that it sold to its customers.  It
advertised that it could obtain confidential telephone records, and, when it received
an order for such records, it fulfilled that order by contacting one of its vendors, and
instructing that vendor to obtain the records.
Accusearch contends that it was not an information content provider because
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12  Accusearch contends that its solicitation of the telephone records from its
vendors should not deprive it of immunity because solicitation is not mentioned in
§ 230(c)(1).  Br. at 39.  But, pursuant to § 230(f)(3), an “information content provider”
is not just one who creates or develops information, but also includes one who is
responsible for the creation or development of information.  Accusearch is responsible
for the telephone records because it orders them from its vendors, i.e., it solicits them.
Because it solicits the records, it is an information content provider and it cannot
satisfy the third immunity requirement.
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it did not create the confidential telephone records -- it notes that the district court
observed that those records were originally created by telephone companies.  Br. at
36-37.  But Accusearch ignores the next sentence in the court’s order: “As a result of
[Accusearch’s] business efforts, [the records] were subsequently misappropriated and
ultimately transmitted via [Accusearch’s] website to end-consumers.”  D.120 at 13
(Appx. 1395).  That is, the information that is at issue here is illegally obtained
telephone records of particular consumers, not simply the underlying data base of all
calls maintained by the telephone company.  And although it was Accusearch’s
vendors that wrongfully obtained the records, Accusearch was “responsible” for that
conduct because the vendors obtained those particular records only after receiving a
specific request for those records from Accusearch.12
Accusearch mistakenly contends that its conduct is akin to that of the defendant
in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee v. Craigslist, supra.  In particular, it twists its own
situation and argues that it “cannot be found to have created or to have ‘participated
in the creation’ of telephone records simply by having a forum in which people
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advertise and request this information.”  Br. at 37-38.  As the Seventh Circuit
explained, defendant craigslist “provides an electronic meeting place for those who
want to buy, sell, or rent housing (and many other goods and services).”  519 F.3d at
668.  A buyer who sees an item on craigslist knows that the item is being sold by an
independent seller, not by craigslist.  If the buyer has questions, the buyer contacts the
seller directly, not craigslist.  And if the buyer chooses to make a purchase, the buyer
makes payment to the seller, not to craigslist.  The item is then delivered by the seller
directly to the buyer, not via craigslist.  
Accusearch is very different from craigslist.  Accusearch did not provide a
“forum,” or an “electronic meeting place” because its customers, who wanted to buy
information, had no contact whatsoever with Accusearch’s vendors.  Indeed,
Accusearch attempted to make sure that its customers did not know the identity of its
vendors, and those customers may not even know that vendors are involved in the
process of obtaining the information they have purchased.  Thus, Accusearch did not
offer any sort of “forum” or “electronic meeting place.”
Because of its extensive role in developing the records that it sold, Accusearch
is not helped by Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998); see Br. at 29.
In that case, plaintiff sued gossip columnist Drudge for defamatory comments that
appeared in his Drudge Report.  Drudge posted the Report on his website, mailed it
to certain e-mail subscribers, and, pursuant to an agreement with America Online,
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13  Ben Ezra v. America Online, supra, and Batzel v. Smith, supra, see Br. at 38,
are similar to Blumenthal v. Drudge.  In neither of those cases did the defendant
engage in the sort of solicitation of the information content that Accusearch used.
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made it available to all America Online subscribers.  That agreement, which had been
in effect for several months at the time of the alleged defamation, provided that
America Online would pay Drudge $3000 per month in return for the right to include
the Drudge Report on its website.  Although Accusearch contends that the court found
that America Online was responsible for “soliciting” the defamatory statements, see
Br. at 38, the court found nothing of the sort.  The court never held that America
Online had “solicited” the defamatory column.  In fact, the court concluded that “there
simply is no evidence that [America Online] had any role in creating or developing
any of the information in the Drudge Report.”  Id. at 50.  Even though America Online
paid Drudge, the court held that America Online “was nothing more than a provider
of an interactive computer service on which the Drudge Report was carried * * *.”
Id.  The crucial fact is that America Online did not hire Drudge to write the allegedly
defamatory column.  Accusearch operated differently because it did solicit the
unlawful searches necessary to obtain the telephone records that it sold.13  Thus, its
situation is very different from that of Blumenthal v. Drudge.
Accusearch’s conduct is more similar to that of the defendant in Fair Housing
Council v. Roommates.com, supra. In that case, the defendant operated a website
designed to match people renting out spare rooms with people looking for a place to
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“information content provider” should be narrowly interpreted.  Br. at 25-26.  In
particular, Accusearch cites that portion of Metrosplash in which the panel stated that
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live.  Users of the website had to create a personal profile, and to do so, they were
required to specify preference in roommates with respect to various criteria, including
sex, sexual orientation, and whether potential renters could or would bring children
into the household.  521 F.3d at 1161.  Defendant then sent periodic e-mail updates
to those who had created profiles, informing them of housing or renters that matched
their preferences.  Plaintiff alleged defendant violated federal and state fair housing
laws by requiring those who used its service to specify preferences with respect to
these three criteria.  Defendant sought immunity pursuant to § 230(c)(1), but the Ninth
Circuit, sitting en banc, held that it was an information content provider, and thus not
entitled to immunity.  “By requiring subscribers to provide the information as a
condition of accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of pre-populated
answers, [defendant] becomes much more than a passive transmitter of information
provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of that information.”  Id.
at 1166.  The court further explained that defendant was not entitled to immunity
because it was responsible “for the predictable consequences of creating a website
designed to solicit and enforce housing preferences that are alleged to be illegal.”  Id.
at 1170.  The court stressed that defendant “both elicits the allegedly illegal content
and makes aggressive use of it in conducting its business.”  Id. at 1172.14
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a website operator could not be held liable for content submitted by a third party.  339
F.3d at 1124.  However, in Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, the Ninth
Circuit, sitting en banc, explained that Metrosplash should not be read so broadly.
“Providing immunity every time a website uses data initially obtained from third
parties would eviscerate the exception to section 230 for ‘develop[ing]’ unlawful
content ‘in whole or in part.’” 521 F.3d at 1171.  Instead, the court explained that
Metrosplash was immune because the libelous content was “developed entirely by the
malevolent user, without prompting or help from the website operator.”  Id.  The key
was that in Metrosplash, “the website did absolutely nothing to encourage the posting
of defamatory content * * *.”  Id.  Unlike the website provided by the defendant in
Metrosplash, Accusearch did prompt and encourage its vendors to obtain information
that could only be obtained unlawfully.
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Accusearch’s involvement is at least as extensive as that of the defendant in
Roommates.com.  Like the defendant in that case, Accusearch is responsible “for the
predictable consequences” of a business model that both “elicits” illegal conduct and
“makes aggressive use of it in conducting its business.”  Accusearch is therefore much
more than a “passive transmitter of information provided by others.”  It is, at least in
part, responsible for the development of that information.  That is, it procured the
information without the knowledge of the consumer being spied on, and it sold the
information without the consumer’s consent.  Thus, it cannot satisfy the final
requirement for § 230(c)(1) immunity.
*     *     *     *     *
Accusearch mistakenly contends that the district court denied its request for
immunity because of its “discomfort” with respect to the information it was selling,
Br. at 42, and that “society as a whole” would benefit if § 230(c)(1) were interpreted
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to immunize its conduct, Br. at 44.  In fact, of course, the district court denied
immunity not for any policy reasons, but because Accusearch could not satisfy the
requirements of § 230(c)(1).  Moreover, although § 230(c)(1) immunity is broad, it
is not unlimited.  
When Congress passed section 230 it didn’t intend to prevent the
enforcement of all laws online; rather, it sought to encourage interactive
computer services that provide users neutral tools to post content online
to police that content without fear that through their “good samaritan .
. . screening of offensive material,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), they would
become liable for every single message posted by third parties on their
websites.
Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175 (emphasis in original).
Because Accusearch is not merely providing “neutral tools” to third parties, the
district court in no way trenches on Congress’s policy.  
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 47 U.S.C. § 222
DOES NOT OF THE DEPRIVE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
OF JURISDICTION OVER ACCUSEARCH’S CONDUCT
There is no merit to any of the jurisdictional arguments that Accusearch makes
based on the privacy protection provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
It contends that, because those provisions, which prohibit telecommunications carriers
from disclosing customer telephone records without consent, apply only to
telecommunications carriers, and because Accusearch is not a telecommunications
carrier, its dissemination of those records is somehow exempt from challenge under
any other law.  It also argues that, because the FCC enforces the privacy provisions
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of the Telecommunications Act, the Commission is precluded from taking any action
that affects the dissemination of such records.  Not surprisingly, Accusearch has no
authority to support its arguments.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 protects the privacy of the customer
telephone records that Accusearch sold.  The Act defines “customer proprietary
network information” to mean:
(A) information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type,
destination, location, and amount of use of a telecommunications service
subscribed to by any customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that is
made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the carrier-
customer relationship; and (B) information contained in the bills pertaining to
telephone exchange service or telephone toll service received by a customer of
a carrier[.]
47 U.S.C. § 222(h)(1).  Customer proprietary network information encompasses the
customer telephone records that Accusearch sold.  The Telecommunications Act
further provides that:
[e]xcept as required by law or with the approval of the customer, a
telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains customer proprietary
network information by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service
shall only use, disclose, or permit access to individually identifiable customer
proprietary network information in its provision of (A) the telecommunications
service from which such information is derived, or (B) services necessary to,
or used in, the provision of such telecommunications service, including the
publishing of directories.
47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1).  The Act applies to telecommunications carriers, § 222(a)(1),
and it is enforced by the FCC, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B).
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15  Accusearch contends that, during the period covered by the Commission’s
complaint, “it was simply not illegal to obtain phone records, even through fraudulent
means.”  Br. at 60.  Of course, as this case shows, Accusearch is wrong because its
conduct was, at all times, subject to the FTC Act’s prohibition against unfair or
deceptive practices.  Moreover, Accusearch is also incorrect, even if it is referring to
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Accusearch makes the absurd suggestion that, because the Telecommunications
Act restricts telecommunications carriers from disseminating customer telephone
records, any other dissemination of such records must be free from regulation.  Br. at
59-60.  That is, Accusearch contends that once it obtained protected telephone records
(by deception, hacking, etc.) it was free to make any use of those records.  This
argument ignores that “this is an era of overlapping agency jurisdiction under different
statutory mandates.”  FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1168 (D. Colo.
2003), rev’d on other grounds, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).  In this case, the FCC
regulates the dissemination of customer telephone records by telecommunications
carriers, and the Commission has the authority to regulate the practices of others with
respect to those records.  Nothing in the Telecommunications Act restricts the
Commission’s jurisdiction over unfair acts or practices, and repeals by implication are
disfavored.  Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976).  Thus,
nothing precluded the district court from holding that, even though Accusearch was
not subject to the Telecommunications Act, its conduct, which caused substantial
consumer injury, was unfair, and, therefore, in violation of the FTC Act.15
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criminal liability.  It is true that it was not until 2007 that Congress passed the
Telephone Records and Privacy Act, which makes it a crime to sell, transfer, or
receive confidential telephone records information.  18 U.S.C. § 1039.  However,
Accusearch cannot plausibly suggest that, even prior to the passage of that act, it
would have been exempt from prosecution if it, or its vendors at its urging, had
committed a crime (e.g., theft) to obtain the records.
16  Accusearch cites four criminal cases, which it contends establish that
consumers have no expectation of privacy in their telephone records.  Br. at 60.  In
fact, those cases show nothing of the sort.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979),
substantially predates the privacy protections of the Telecommunications Act.  United
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Nor is there any merit to Accusearch’s suggestion that the Commission was
somehow attempting to enforce the Telecommunications Act.  See Br. at 62-63.  As
the complaint clearly shows, the Commission alleged that Accusearch violated the
FTC Act, not the Telecommunications Act.  D.1.  However, the Telecommunications
Act was certainly not irrelevant to the Commission’s case.  As explained above, to
show that a practice is “unfair” pursuant to the FTC Act, the Commission must show
that the practice caused substantial consumer injury.  Here, Accusearch caused
substantial consumer injury because it obtained confidential consumer telephone
records without consumers’ knowledge, and made them available, for a price, to third
parties including stalkers and abusers.  The Telecommunications Act recognizes the
potential injury that could result from free access to such telephone records and it
attempts to restrict their release.  It also recognizes the importance of protecting
consumer privacy.  The very harm that the Telecommunications Act attempts to
prevent is the harm that Accusearch caused by evading the protections of that act.16
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States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), is irrelevant because it not only predates the
Telecommunications Act, but also concerns the privacy of bank records, not telephone
records.  And, although New Hampshire v. Gubitosi, 886 A.2d 1029 (N.H. 2005), and
Oregon v. Johnson, 131 P. 3d 173 (Or. 2006), both postdate the Telecommunications
Act and involve telephone records, the Act did not protect the records in either case
because law enforcement authorities had subpoenaed the records at issue.  Pursuant
to 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1), the privacy protections of the Act do not apply where their
release is required by law.  See ICG Communications, Inc. v. Allegiance Telecom, 211
F.R.D. 610, 612-614 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (where records are sought pursuant to
discovery governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, release is required by law
and the protections of the Telecommunications Act do not apply).
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Thus, the Telecommunications Act neither precludes the Commission from policing
Accusearch’s unfair practices nor shields those illegal practices.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ENTERING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST ACCUSEARCH
The district court did not abuse its discretion when, after determining that
Accusearch caused substantial consumer injury and violated the FTC Act, it entered
an injunction to prevent future violations.  That relief was justified by law, and
appropriate under the circumstances of this case.  Also, the relief did not contravene
any provision of the Constitution.
A. The court did not abuse its discretion
It is well established that § 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), gives the
district court “authority to grant a permanent injunction against violations of any
provisions of law enforced by the Commission . . ..”  FTC v. Evans Products Co., 775
F.2d 1084, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original), and Accusearch has not
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17  Accusearch cites Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews, 12 P.3d 977
(Okla. Civ. App. 2000), and contends that injunctions should be entered “sparingly
and cautiously.”  Br. at 47.  But that case is irrelevant because it involved a private
lawsuit, not the enforcement of a federal law.  Accusearch also cites Chief Justice
Burger’s separate concurrence in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 703 (1980), in which
he refers to injunctive relief as a “drastic remedy.”  Br. at 47.  But Accusearch ignores
that Chief Justice Burger also cited with approval Manor Nursing Centers and the
standard for injunctive relief set forth in that case.  In any event, injunctive relief is
routinely awarded in cases brought by the Commission to enforce the FTC Act.  See
cases listed at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/index.shtm.
18  Accusearch claims that it advised its vendors to conduct searches in
compliance with the law.  Brief of Appellants (“Br.”) at 33.  But, as explained above,
this was mere window dressing because some vendors refused to reveal their search
techniques to Accusearch, and Accusearch was aware that others were using deception
to obtain the information that Accusearch had solicited.  See D.75, Ex. 19 at Att. A,
pp. 6, 10, 28.
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argued otherwise.  Moreover, when a court has determined that a defendant has
violated a law that furthers the public interest, as has happened here, “[t]he critical
question for a district court in deciding whether to issue a permanent injunction in
view of past violations is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will
be repeated.”  SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir.
1972).17
There is ample evidence in the record that it is reasonably likely that
Accusearch’s violations will recur.  Illegal past conduct creates an inference that
future violations will occur.  SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, id.  This is particularly
so given the egregious nature of Accusearch’s privacy violation, the harm it caused,
see supra, and the fact that it knew, or should have known of that harm.18  In addition,
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although Accusearch has ceased selling confidential consumer telephone records, the
district court found that it is still in the business of selling other personal and private
information obtained by its vendors (social security number verification, motor
vehicle records, cell phone traces), D.120 at 2 (Appx. 1384), and it could easily
resume its past illegal conduct.  Finally, Accusearch’s attitude is relevant.  In
particular, defendant Patel, who controls Accusearch, has expressed disdain for
individual privacy.  See D.75, Ex. 45 at Att. A (“I don’t even believe in privacy too
much”).  That is, he puts little stake in the values that underlie both § 222 of the
Telecommunications Act and the Commission’s case.  Clearly, this lack of
appreciation for privacy makes it more likely that, in the future, he will violate the law
or turn a blind eye to such practices.
None of Accusearch’s arguments satisfies its burden of showing that the district
court abused its discretion when it entered injunctive relief.  See United States v. W.T.
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (defendant bears the “heavy” burden of showing
that there is no reasonable expectation that its past violations will be repeated).
Accusearch cites to the Telephone Records and Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1039
(“TRPA”), and claims that no injunction is necessary because its past conduct now
violates that law.  Br. at 48-49.  But a law violation is a predicate to injunctive relief,
not a shield against such relief.  That is, in a case such as this one, the court must first
determine that the law has been violated before it even considers the appropriateness
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19  Accusearch cites Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 193 (2000), where the Supreme Court noted that
cessation of conduct is “an important factor” bearing on the appropriateness of
injunctive relief.  Br. at 50.  But the Court makes clear that cessation is only a factor
to be considered; it is not determinative.  In a case such as this one, where there are
other factors that indicate that Accusearch’s illegal conduct is likely to recur, cessation
does not undermine the need for injunctive relief.
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of injunctive relief.  The mere fact that Accusearch’s past conduct might now violate
two laws (i.e., the TRPA and the FTC Act) instead of just one, is not relevant to the
crucial issue -- whether that conduct is likely to recur.
In any event, the TRPA is a criminal law.  Not only does the Commission have
no authority to enforce that law, but also its prohibitions are not congruent with the
FTC Act.  Criminal intent is an element of a TRPA violation, but the Commission
need not establish intent to show that the FTC Act has been violated.  See FTC v.
Freecom Communications, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1204 n.7 (10th Cir. 2005) (scienter
is not an element of an FTC Act violation).  Thus, Accusearch could violate the FTC
Act without violating the TRPA.
Nor is the injunctive relief obviated by the fact that, three months before the
Commission filed its complaint, Accusearch stopped selling telephone records.  See
Br. at 49-50.  Cessation of illegal activities does not deprive the court of its authority
to enter injunctive relief.  United States v. W.T. Grant, 629 U.S. at 633.19  Nor does
cessation, even voluntary cessation, demonstrate that illegal conduct will not recur.
This is particularly so where, as here, Accusearch ceased selling telephone records
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20  Defendant Patel claims that Accusearch stopped selling telephone records
on January 20, 2006.  He further claims that Accusearch did so as a result of the fact
that it learned that one of its vendors was pretexting (i.e., using deception) to obtain
the records.  Br. at 14; App. at 1248.  But Accusearch had ample evidence well before
that time that its vendors were using illegal techniques to obtain records.  See D.75,
Ex. 19 at Att. A, pp. 6, 10, 28.  Moreover, in January 2006, Accusearch learned that
it was under investigation by the FCC.  D.58, Ex. 3 at 20.  Courts are well aware that,
faced with the prospect of an enforcement action, targets of investigations are all too
likely to undergo eleventh-hour conversions and bring their conduct (temporarily) into
compliance with the law.  See SEC v. Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1100 (inference that
illegal conduct will be repeated is “particularly appropriate here where appellants did
not attempt to cease or undo the effects of their unlawful activity until the institution
of an investigation”).  
21  Accusearch notes that, in February 2006, the Commission’s staff sent letters
to other entities that were selling consumer telephone records, warning that those
entities might be violating the law.  Accusearch inferred that it did not receive such
a letter because it had already ceased selling telephone records.  In fact, at the time the
Commission’s staff sent out the warning letters, the Commission’s investigation of
Accusearch was already well under way.  As a matter of course, the Commission’s
staff does not send warning letters to entities already under investigation.
22  Nor does the fact that, in addition to injunctive relief, the court also required
Accusearch to disgorge its ill-gotten profits demonstrate that its violations are unlikely
to recur.  Indeed, when the Commission shows that the law has been violated, the
court may use the full range of its equitable authority to remedy the violation and to
prevent recurrence.  FTC v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314
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when its conduct was already under investigation.20  Also, although Accusearch
stopped selling telephone records, it continues to sell other private and personal
information.21  Given the other evidence showing that Accusearch’s violations were
likely to recur, the mere fact that it ceased selling telephone records shortly before the
Commission filed its complaint does not show that the court abused its discretion
when it entered injunctive relief.22
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(8th Cir. 1991); FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 1989);
FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1434 (11th Cir. 1984); FTC v. H.N.
Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982).
45
B. The injunctive relief does not violate the Constitution
There is no merit to any of Accusearch’s constitutional arguments.  First, its
free speech rights are not violated.  See Br. at 62.  To the extent that the First
Amendment is implicated at all, it is only the protection for commercial speech.  See
U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1233 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999) (expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience is commercial speech);
Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same).  Accusearch
mistakenly assumes that commercial speech is entitled to absolute constitutional
protection.  See Br. at 57, 62.  In fact, as this Court has recognized, the Supreme Court
has set forth a three-part test to determine whether a restriction of non-misleading
commercial speech violates the First Amendment.  U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1233, citing
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm. of New York, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).  First, the government must have imposed the restriction to further a
substantial interest.  Second, the restriction must directly and materially advance that
interest.  Third, the restriction must be no more extensive than necessary to further
that interest.
The injunctive relief imposed by the court passes the first part of the test
because it seeks to further a substantial interest: protecting the privacy of sensitive
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consumer information, and keeping that information out of the hands of unauthorized
third parties, such as abusers and stalkers.  As this Court explained in U.S. West,
where, as here, the government has shown that the release of information may lead to
abuse and harassment, the government’s privacy interest is substantial.  182 F.3d at
1235.  Second, the restrictions imposed by the district court directly further the
government’s interest because they prevent abusers and stalkers from obtaining easy
access to confidential information regarding their prey.  This case is very different
from U.S. West, where there was no evidence that harm to privacy would actually
occur.  182 F.3d at 1237.  Here, the Commission presented ample evidence that, as a
result of Accusearch’s practices, substantial harm had occurred, or was likely to occur,
including abuse and stalking.  The Commission has also shown that Accusearch
caused economic loss and substantial emotional injury.  Third, the restrictions
imposed by the injunction are narrowly tailored because they prevent the very sorts
of privacy infringements that result in the harm the Commission seeks to prevent.
Accusearch incorrectly contends that the injunction would prevent it from selling any
consumer information.  See Br. at 17, 56.  To the contrary, the court’s order
specifically permits Accusearch to obtain and sell consumer personal information if
that information was lawfully obtained, or if the consumer consented to the sale.  See
D.132 at 3-4.  That is, Accusearch is only prohibited from selling information that has
been illegally obtained, or without consent.  Thus, the injunctive relief is narrowly
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23  CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2000), does not help
Accusearch.  See Br. at 54.  In that case, CPC, which markets Skippy peanut butter,
sued Skippy Inc., for trademark infringement.  Skippy Inc., owned the rights to a
cartoon character named Skippy.  Skippy Inc., had attempted to license the cartoon
character and the Skippy name to a marketer of caramel corn, popcorn, and nuts.
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tailored -- indeed, it is hard to imagine how it could possibly be more narrowly
tailored.  Because the relief satisfies all three parts of the Central Hudson test, it does
not interfere with Accusearch’s First Amendment rights.
Nor has Accusearch shown any violation of its Fifth Amendment due process
rights.  See Br. at 53-56.  It mistakenly contends that the injunction must be limited
to telephone records.  In fact, the Supreme Court has made clear that a law violator
should expect broad injunctive relief:
As we said in FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952), “[T]he
Commission is not limited to prohibiting the illegal practice in the
precise form in which it is found to have existed in the past.”  Having
been caught violating the [FTC] Act, respondents “must expect some
fencing in.”  FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (1957).
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 395 (1965).  Here, the injunction
prohibits Accusearch from selling illegally obtained telephone records and any other
illegally obtained consumer personal information.  That is, the injunction prohibits
Accusearch from engaging in the same type of unlawful conduct that it employed in
the past.  Given the ease with which Accusearch could apply its unlawful techniques
to other consumer information (i.e., protected bank records, or protected health
information), the court properly applied the injuction to such conduct.23
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Plaintiff CPC prevailed and the court entered an injunction prohibiting Skippy Inc.,
from licensing its name or the character for use on caramel corn, any peanut product,
or any other food product.  Although the court of appeals cautioned that injunctions
must be narrowly tailored, it did so only after the district court attempted to enforce
the injunction against a website posted by Skippy Inc., on which it argued that it had
been bullied by CPC.  However, there was no indication in the case that the provision
in the original injunction, which prohibited Skippy, Inc., from licensing its name for
any food, posed any problem.  The injunction here is no broader than the injunction
in CPC v. Skippy.
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Accusearch cites NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), to
support the proposition that an injunction must restrain only unlawful conduct.  Br.
at 54.  Of course, that is exactly what the injunction here does -- it only prohibits
Accusearch from selling information that it has not been obtained lawfully or with the
consumer’s consent.  Moreover, Claiborne Hardware involved an injunction that
prohibited conduct that was entitled to full First Amendment protection.  Id. at 924.
Here, as explained above, the conduct to which the injunction applies is subject to the
intermediate commercial speech standard.  The injunction easily passes that standard.
See supra.  Thus, there is no merit to Accusearch’s due process challenge.
Finally, Accusearch mistakenly contends that the district court’s injunction
somehow violates its right to equal protection under the laws.  In particular,
Accusearch contends that other entities that were prosecuted by the Commission
received less stringent treatment than it did.  See Br. at 18, 57-58.  However, it is well
settled that “some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional
violation so long as the selection was not deliberately based upon an unjustifiable
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24  In connection with its equal protection argument, Accusearch complains that
the Commission submitted a declaration to the district court that, according to
Accusearch, contained inaccurate information.  That declaration addresses the status
of several other companies that sold personal information and that had been
prosecuted by the Commission.  Br. at 57-58.  The declarant, Ms. Tracy Thorleifson,
explains that those companies had become inactive.  Accusearch challenges that
declaration based on an inference -- because it can locate a company’s website, it
infers that the company must be active.  Appx. 1533.  In fact, as Ms. Thorleifson’s
Declaration explains, the mere fact that it is possible to locate a company’s website
on the internet does not establish that the company remains in business, or that, even
if it is in business, it has not altered its business.  Appx. 1595-97.  In any event,
because Accusearch cannot show that it is a member of a protected class, the status
of other companies prosecuted by the Commission is irrelevant to Accusearch’s equal
protection argument (and to every other argument that it has raised before this Court).
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standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”  Potter v. Murray
City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1071 (10th Cir. 1985); see United States v. Amon, 669 F.2d 1351,
1355 (10th Cir. 1981) (same).  Indeed, selective prosecution constitutes a violation of
the Constitution only if the defendant can establish that the government acted with bad
intent, that the defendant is a member of a constitutionally protected class, and that
others outside that class were not prosecuted.  Fog Cutter Capital Group Inc. v. SEC,
474 F.3d 822, 826-27 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  Accusearch can show none of these factors:
indeed, it has never alleged that the Commission acted with any sort of bad intent.
Accordingly, this constitutional argument, like the others, fails.24
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CONCLUSION
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Commission believes that the issues in this case were correctly resolved by
the district court, and are adequately addressed by the parties’ briefs.  Nonetheless, the
Commission also believes that this Court’s understanding of the issues could benefit
from argument.  Accordingly, the Commission requests oral argument.
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